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JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE
State Dept., OSD reviews completed

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REFERENCE: STATE 063739 AND 063856

FOR AMBASSADOR OR PRINCIPAL OFFICER AND
SENIOR MILITARY COMMANDER

SUBJECT: STAFFDEL LOWENSTEIN-MOOSE

1. JAMES LOWENSTEIN AND RICHARD MOOSE, STAFF MEMBERS FOR THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON U.S. SECURITY COMMITMENTS ABROAD (SYMINGTON SUBCOMMITTEE) WILL BE VISITING YOUR POST AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN YOUR COUNTRY AS PART OF A THREE-WEEK TRIP BEGINNING APRIL 21.

2. THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE RECONSTITUTED SUBCOMMITTEE ARE: "SUBJECT TO SPECIAL FACT-FINDING REQUESTS WHICH THE FULL COMMITTEE MAY SUBMIT FROM TIME TO TIME, THIS SUBCOMMITTEE ON ITS OWN MOTION WILL FOCUS PARTICULAR ATTENTION ON OVERSEAS COMMITMENTS AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES ABROAD WHICH AFFECT THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES. DURING THE FORTHCOMING CONGRESS, THIS WILL REQUIRE THAT THE SUBCOMMITTEE FOLLOW CLOSELY THE QUESTION OF THE DUPLICATION OF ACTIVITY IN THE OVERSEAS INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND OF SECRECY IN THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY IN A DEMOCRACY."

3. BOTH STAFF MEMBERS WERE FORMERLY WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND MOOSE ALSO WITH NSC STAFF, AND HAVE HAD CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE WITH SFRC. THEY ARE HIGHLY KNOWLEDGEABLE AND WELL PREPARED. FROM PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS HERE, WE TEND TO BELIEVE THAT THEIR APPROACH WILL BE BOTH MORE SOPHISTICATED AND MORE UNDERSTANDING OF FOREIGN RELATIONS IMPLICATIONS THAN WAS THAT OF THEIR PREDECESSORS, MESSRS. PINCUS AND PAUL. NEVERTHELESS THEIR APPROACH WILL LIKELY BE THAT OF PARTICIPANTS IN AN ADVERSARY PROCESS.

4. WE THINK THEY WILL BE ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN WHETHER AND TO WHAT EXTENT U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND COMMITMENTS IN ASIA MAKE MORE DIFFICULT THE IMPROVEMENT OF OUR RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS IN THE AREA; AND CONVERSELY, WHETHER WE WILL HAVE TO PAY A PRICE TO FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS IN TERMS OF ADDITIONAL COMMITMENTS OR SUPPORT IN TERMS OF OUR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE OUR OWN RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES.

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5. BOTH OFFICERS CARRY TOP-SECRET CLEARANCE AND SHOULD BE GIVEN A FULL AND FRANK EXPOSITION OF THE SITUATION AND PROBLEMS IN YOUR COUNTRY, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE FOREGOING, SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC GUIDANCE:

A. THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE HAVE DECIDED THAT WITNESSES BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE WILL BE INSTRUCTED NOT TO TESTIFY ON (1) NUCLEAR MATTERS. (2) MILITARY CONTINGENCY PLANS OR RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, PAST, PRESENT OR PROPOSED, (INCLUDING OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF ANY JOINT INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS). (3) OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF SENSITIVE OPERATIONS, THE DISCLOSURE OF WHICH IS LIKELY TO JEOPARDIZE THE SAFETY OF U.S. FORCES. (4) IF MAP PLANS AND PROGRAMS BEYOND FY-1972 ARE BROUGHT UP, YOU SHOULD ONLY SAY NO DECISIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN BEYOND FY-1972. INFORMATION PROVIDED COMMITTEE STAFF SHOULD BE LIMITED ACCORDINGLY. HOWEVER, STAFF WAS SUPPLIED PACAF REG. 55-2 IN CONNECTION WITH EARLIER HEARINGS. MOREOVER, POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON BOMBING IN SEA MAY BE DISCUSSED. INFORMATION ON NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS ABROAD AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS THEREOF WERE MADE AVAILABLE TO FULL SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE. FURTHER INQUIRIES BY STAFFDEL SHOULD BE REFERRED TO WASHINGTON. IN VIEW THEREOF, YOU SHOULD SIMPLY REFER STAFF TO THIS PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH ANY QUESTIONS ON NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS. STAFF MEMBERS WILL BE INFORMED OF THIS POSITION PRIOR TO THEIR DEPARTURE.

B. IT HAS BEEN DECIDED THAT NO TESTIMONY WILL BE GIVEN ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS EXCEPT BY THE DIRECTORS OF CIA, NSA, AND DIA, AS THE CASE MAY BE, UNDER SPECIAL SECURITY PROCEDURES, EXCEPT FOR PERSONNEL WITH RESPONSIBILITIES TO DIRNSA, WHO WILL BE GUIDED BY SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS, REFERENCES TO NSA INSTALLATIONS, PERSONNEL AND OPERATIONS WILL BE LIMITED TO MOST GENERAL STATEMENT OF FACT THEY EXIST, AND DETAILS LEFT TO BE HANDLED BY DIRNSA REPRESENTATIVES. IF ASKED FOR DETAILS OF ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS, STAFF MEMBERS SHOULD BE REMINDED THAT ONLY THE DIRECTORS OF THE RESPECTIVE

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INTELLIGENCE SERVICES MAY PROVIDE THAT INFORMATION.
EMBASSY REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD GENERALLY RESTRICT
COMMENTS TO POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF INTELLIGENCE
PRESENCE AND ACTIVITIES.

FOR TAIPEI ONLY:

AMBASSADOR MCCONAUGHY WILL RECALL HIS TESTIMONY IN
SPECIAL SESSION BEFORE THE SYMINGTON SUBCOMMITTEE OF
26 NOVEMBER 1969 ON CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
HE MAY WISH TO REFER TO THAT RECORD, THUS AVOIDING THE
NECESSITY OF DISCUSSING THE SENSITIVE MATTERS UNDER
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT COULD LEAD TO LESS THAN THE MOST
CAREFUL HANDLING OF THIS INFORMATION.

FOR VIENTIANE ONLY:

AMBASSADOR GODLEY MAY ORALLY UPDATE THE SPECIAL BRIEFING
HE GAVE SFRC LAST SUMMER ON LAOS IS STAFF INQUIRES.

6. REQUESTS FOR PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE OR COMMUNICATIONS
OTHER THAN THAT MADE PUBLIC SHOULD BE REFERRED TO WASHINGTON
FOR ANSWER.

7. REQUESTS FOR ANY INFORMATION OR DOCUMENTS ABOUT WHICH THERE IS
ANY DOUBT SHOULD BE REFERRED PROMPTLY TO WASHINGTON. EVERY
ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO AVOID CONFRONTATION OVER DENIAL OF ACCESS
TO SUCH MATERIAL. BUT, IF NECESSARY, YOU MAY ADVISE STAFF YOU
ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO FURNISH DOCUMENTS OF CERTAIN SENSITIVITY
AT THE POST, BUT ARE REFERRING THEIR REQUEST TO WASHINGTON.

8. DESIRE TO REITERATE THE POLICY OF BOTH STATE AND
DEFENSE TO COOPERATE IN ASSISTING THE STAFF TO PURSUE ITS
INVESTIGATION WHICH IS WELL WITHIN THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF
THE CONGRESS. WE WILL ADVISE THEM IN A GENERAL WAY OF THE
SENSE OF THIS INSTRUCTION.

9. YOU SHOULD ADVISE THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE
IN DETAIL AS TO THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE STAFF, THE
INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED, THE DOCUMENTS TO WHICH THEY HAD
ACCESS AND THOSE WHICH THEY HAD REQUESTED BUT NOT SEEN. COPIES
OF ALL PAPERS PROVIDED SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO WASHINGTON.

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10. COMMITTEE STAFF HAVE ADVISED THAT THEY WILL WISH TO
SPEAK WITH FOREIGN OFFICIALS AT TAIPEI AND PRESUMBABLY ELSEWHERE.
ADDRESSEES SHOULD FACILITATE AS APPROPRIATE

11. ADDRESSEES ADVISE SUBORDINATE POSTS AND COMMANDS AS
APPROPRIATE.

12. ADVISE DEPARTMENT IF STAFFDEL DECIDES TO VISIT ANY
INFORMATION ADDRESSEE POST, AND OF ALL CHANGES IN ITINERARY.
ROGERS

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